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he absence at common law of an obligation of rule-makers 
to consult before making rules, or even to publish the rules, 
leaves any attempt to secure transparency in rule-making in 
Australia to statutory intervention.1 Statute has traditionally played 
an important but limited part.  
In Australia formal statutory requirements for the making of 
delegated legislation have followed the Westminster tradition. 
When rules of a legislative character, or delegated legislation, are 
made, they must be notified in the government gazette, scrutinised 
by a parliamentary committee, tabled in parliament with the 
potential for disallowance, and published in a formal manner. 
These requirements are set out in federal, State and Territory 
interpretation statutes. They achieve only a basic degree of 
transparency.  
The interpretation statutes have not traditionally provided for 
public notification in advance of the making of a proposed rule, or 
consultation with individuals or groups whose interests it affects. 
Requirements for consultation have featured in particular statutes, 
typically those regulating planning or the environment, but there 
was no general statutory requirement for consultation in rule-
making, such as the notice and comment requirements in the 
United States. 
This paper traces the genesis of general statutory requirements in 
Australia for notice and consultation in rule-making, occurring at 
the State level, with a view to understanding the current federal 
general provision relating to notice and consultation. Attention will 
be given to the link, if any, between general requirements for notice 
and consultation, and requirements for regulatory impact 
assessment, whether statutory or informal. In the background is 
the consideration that the omission of a genuine consultation 
component in rule making processes may impair not only the 
democratic good of participation in government decision-making 
but also the effectiveness of regulatory impact assessment. 
§ 1 – GENESIS OF REFORM 
In 1984 Victoria was the first of the Australian States to introduce 
statutory requirements to prepare and notify regulatory impact 
                                                
1 See, for the common-law position, Re Gosling (1943) 43 SR (NSW) 312 at 318; Bread of 
New South Wales Manufacturers v Evans (1981) 180 CLR 404 at 415; Kioa v West (1985) 159 
CLR 550 at 584, 620, adopting the position in the United Kingdom in Bates v Lord 
Hailsham [1972] 3 All ER 1019 at 1024. 
T 
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statements when making rules, and to consult with interest groups 
when the rules are made.2 This was accompanied by sun-setting 
provisions that trigger regular review of rules in accordance with 
this process. The Victorian reform followed a report that expressly 
accepted that consultation by government with the public in 
relation to policies or decisions that affect the public generally or 
particular localities or groups, is a desirable goal in a democratic 
system, enhancing participation by individuals in government 
decision-making and effective public administration.3 Interest 
groups were acknowledged to play a vital role in facilitating 
consultation.4 Processes should be put in place to enable public 
interest groups to enjoy consultation in rule-making to the same 
degree as is informally provided to business and trade union 
groups.5  
Specific recommendations of the Committee, confirming and 
refining the provisions of the bill under review, were that notice be 
given of a proposed rule not just in the government gazette and a 
daily newsletter, as provided for in the bill, but also where 
appropriate in a trade, professional, business and/or public interest 
journal, newsletter or circular.6 Copies of the regulatory impact 
statement (RIS) for the rule should be made available on request, 
with any copying fee being reasonable.7 Public comments and 
submissions should be invited, not necessarily within 21 days as 
provided for in the bill, but within not less than 21 days.8 The bill’s 
proposal that submissions received be considered by the rule-
maker was considered to be appropriate.9 
The Committee’s views were heavily influenced by its examination 
of notice and comment rule making procedures in the United 
States and Canada.10 In connection with the argument for 
deregulation in Australia, the Committee considered that the 
introduction of rule-making requirements such as an RIS 
procedure was directed to ensuring that rules are in accordance 
with community needs.11  
In its report the Committee’s examination of consultation12 
followed its consideration of deregulation, without an indication as 
to what may be the link between the two. The rationale for an RIS 
procedure was said to be enhancing decision–making by ensuring 
all possible information is available to the rule-maker.13  
                                                
2 Subordinate Legislation Act 1984 (Vic). This has now been repealed and replaced by the 
Subordinate Legislation Act 1994 (Vic). Parts 2 and 2A of the 1994 Act deal with RISs and 
consultation. 
3 Victoria, Parliament, Legal and Constitutional Committee, A REPORT TO PARLIAMENT ON THE 
SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION (DEREGULATION) BILL 1983, September 1984, paras 85, 85.1. 
4 Victoria, Parliament, Legal and Constitutional Committee, op. cit., para 88. 
5 Victoria, Parliament, op. cit., paras 89, 89.3. 
6 Victoria, Parliament, op. cit., paras 187.1-188, Recommendation 56. 
7 Victoria, Parliament, op. cit., paras 191-192, Recommendation 58. 
8 Victoria, Parliament, op. cit., paras 193-194, Recommendation 59. 
9 Victoria, Parliament, op. cit., paras 195-196, Recommendation 60. 
10 Victoria, Parliament, op. cit., paras 50-56.5, 86.1-86.9. 
11 Victoria, Parliament, op. cit., paras 57-65. 
12 Victoria, Parliament, op. cit., paras 66-68. 
13 Victoria, Parliament, op. cit., para 79.4. 
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The Committee made an assumption that consultation with regard 
to an RIS would enable more information from interested groups 
with expertise in particular areas, so that competing economic, 
social and moral claims would be more adequately represented and 
evaluated. This should result in the making of rules that benefit the 
community to the optimum degree possible, rather than benefiting 
sectional interests, to the detriment of the whole community.14 
Indeed the Committee assumed that an RIS procedure “accords 
with the principles of openness as embodied for example, in 
freedom of information legislation”,15 and enables interest groups 
to influence the rule-making process in a transparent manner.16 The 
Committee did not consider the possibility that an RIS procedure 
could be disconnected from consultation, or not include 
consultation with regard to the RIS itself. 
Amendments were made to the bill, to implement the Committee’s 
recommendations. Following the enactment of the bill in 1984, and 
replacement legislation in 1994, the RIS, public notice and 
consultation provisions continue to be core requirements in the 
Subordinate Legislation Act 1994 (Vic) (Vic SL Act).17 Another 
important element of the Vic SL Act is sunsetting of statutory rules 
after 10 years, with exceptions and room for postponements.18 This 
ensures that a fresh procedure of RIS, public notice and 
consultation is triggered regularly. 
In 1989 New South Wales (NSW) followed Victoria.19 Tasmania 
followed in 199220 and Queensland in 1994.21 In 2001 the 
Australian Capital Territory (ACT) introduced a statutory RIS 
requirement, without provision for notifying the public of a 
proposed rule or for consultation.22 The NSW scheme is selected 
for analysis and comparison with the federal position, which is 
                                                
14 Victoria, Parliament, op. cit., para 79.5. 
15 Victoria, Parliament, op. cit., para 82.1. 
16 Victoria, Parliament, op. cit., paras 82.3, 82.6. 
17 Subordinate Legislation (Review and Revocation) Act 1984 (Vic), inserting a new Part 
II into the Subordinate Legislation Act 1962 (Vic). The later Act was replaced by the 
Subordinate Legislation Act 1994 (Vic) (Vic SL Act), in which the provisions for RIS, 
notice and consultation were retained: Vic SL Act ss 6, 7, 10, 11, 12I. These provisions 
extended the requirements to cover “legislative instruments” as well as “statutory rules”. 
Additional provision was made for consultation in accordance with ministerial guidelines: 
Vic SL Act ss 6, 12C. 
18 Vic SL Act ss 5, 5A. 
19 Subordinate Legislation Act 1989 (NSW) (NSW SL Act). 
20 Subordinate Legislation Act 1992 (Tas) s 5, Sch 2. 
21 The Statutory Instruments and Legislative Standards Amendment Act 1994 (Qld) 
inserted a new Part 5 into the Statutory Instruments Act 1992 (Qld), providing for 
guidelines for regulatory impact statements and public notification. Sunsetting was 
provided for in Part 7 although this had been introduced earlier, by the Regulatory 
Reform Act 1986 (Qld). The current provisions require an explanatory note 
accompanying subordinate legislation to include a regulatory impact statement for 
significant instruments and a similar assessment for other instruments, with an 
explanation of the consultation program: Legislative Standards Act 1992 (Qld) s 24. 
22 Legislation Act 2001 (ACT) Part 5.2 9aotnain in particular ss 34, 35). This Act applies 
to “subordinate laws” and “disallowable instruments”. Section 32 of this Act provides 
that Part 5.2 does not affect any requirement in any other ACT law for publication or 
consultation about a proposal to make a subordinate law or disallowable instrument, and 
that if some other ACT law imposes publication or consultation requirements of a 
comparable level, Part 5.2 does not apply. This is a curious provision given that Part 5.2 
imposes no consultation requirement.  
Transparency and Rule Making in Australia – Margaret Allars 
– 182 – 
International Journal of Open Governments 
http://ojs.imodev.org/index.php?journal=RIGO 
described later. In NSW, as in Victoria, an RIS procedure is 
combined with notice and consultation requirements. 
§ 3 – NEW SOUTH WALES 
 Public Notices of Proposed Rule and Regulatory 
Impact Statements 
The introduction in NSW of general provisions for RIS, notice and 
consultation, in the Subordinate Legislation Act 1989 (NSW) (NSW 
SL Act), was preceded by a recommendation by a parliamentary 
select committee charged with reporting on the reduction of red 
tape for small business.23 The committee recommended that the 
NSW parliamentary committee with the function of scrutinising 
delegated legislation should take into account whether a proposed 
rule had an impact upon small business. It also proposed a staged 
repeal of delegated legislation, with remaking only of those rules 
considered essential after detailed evaluation and public 
consultation.24  
The Regulation Review Act 1987 (NSW) (re-named in the 
Legislation Review Act 1987 (NSW)) which followed included, as 
one of the criteria to be applied by the parliamentary scrutiny 
committee, the question whether the rule may have an adverse 
impact on the business community.25 The parliamentary scrutiny 
committee was named the Regulation Review Committee, but in 
2002 was renamed the Legislation Review Committee, when it 
acquired an additional function of scrutinising bills.26  
Two years later the Subordinate Legislation Act 1989 (NSW) (NSW 
SL Act) was enacted, introducing an RIS procedure, notice and 
consultation requirements similar to those operating in Victoria. 
This step was preceded by a report of the Regulation Review 
Committee recommending the introduction of legislation similar 
to the Vic SL Act.27 The report considered deregulation measures 
in several other countries, referring in particular to the Reagan 
Administration’s establishment of the Office of Management and 
Budget, the issue of the 1981 Executive Order and later Regulatory 
Policy Guidelines.28 The Committee did not doubt the desirability 
of including a consultation requirement akin to that in Victoria, 
stating its approach shortly: 
“[...] the preparation of an RIS is not just an opportunity 
for government to reappraise Government options. One of 
                                                
23 New South Wales Parliament Select Committee of the Legislative Assembly Upon 
Small Business, Report No 1, REGULATION AND LICENSING. 
24 New South Wales Parliament Select Committee of the Legislative Assembly Upon 
Small Business, Report No 1, REGULATION AND LICENSING. 
25 NSW LR Act s 9(1)(b)(ii). 
26 Amendments made by the Legislation Review Amendment Act 2002 (NSW). 
27 New South Wales Parliament Regulation Review Committee, PROPOSAL FOR THE 
STAGED REVIEW OF NEW SOUTH WALES STATUTORY RULES FOR DISCUSSION, February 
1989. 
28 New South Wales Parliament Regulation Review Committee, PROPOSAL FOR THE 
STAGED REVIEW OF NEW SOUTH WALES STATUTORY RULES FOR DISCUSSION, February 
1989, pp 18-22. 
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their main purposes is to inform the public of the various 
options under consideration and of the anticipated impacts 
of each option so that affected members of the community 
can participate in government decision-making with a view 
to identifying the most efficient and equitable outcomes.”29 
The two NSW Acts work together, with the NSW SL Act 
providing for the RIS and the written submissions received in 
response to notice of a proposed statutory rule, to be forwarded to 
the Legislation Review Committee for scrutiny.30 Thus, while the 
RIS requirement was not decoupled from a procedure for public 
notice and consultation, deregulation rather than consultation was 
the animating objective for these two statutes. 
Before a statutory rule is made, the responsible Minister must, as 
far as is reasonably practicable, comply with the guidelines in 
Schedule 1 to the NSW SL Act.31 This imposes an onerous list of 
decision-making requirements, including cost-benefit analysis.32 
Before any principal statutory rule is made, the responsible 
Minister must as far as is practicable prepare an RIS complying 
with Schedule 2.33 The principal statutory rules are those with some 
substantive effect, as distinct from statutory rules that are simply 
direct amendments or repeals, or deal with citation and 
commencement, or are of a savings or transitional nature.34 
However there are significant exceptions to the requirement that 
the responsible Minister comply with the RIS, public notification 
and consultation procedures.35 Where an exception operates, it 
                                                
29 New South Wales Parliament Regulation Review Committee, PROPOSAL FOR THE 
STAGED REVIEW OF NEW SOUTH WALES STATUTORY RULES FOR DISCUSSION, February 
1989, p 44. 
30 NSW SL Act s 5(4). 
31 NSW SL Act s 4. 
32 The NSW SL Act applies only to the making of a class of delegated legislation. In 
Australia a statute may delegate legislative power to make instruments to any member of 
the executive branch. This includes a Minister or statutory authority although more often 
the delegation is made to the Governor General or a Governor. The NSW SL Act applies 
only to “statutory rules”, which are regulations, by-laws, rules or ordinances made by the 
Governor or approved or affirmed by Governor (except for Schedule 4 instruments). By 
contrast, the NSW LR Act applies to “regulations” which are defined more broadly. The 
result is that pursuant to the NSW LR Act some legislative instruments are subject to 
scrutiny by a parliamentary committee and to potential disallowance, but are not subject 
to the RIS, public notification and consultation procedure under the NSW SL Act.  
33 NSW SL Act s 5. 
34 NSW SL Act ss 3 (definition of “principal statutory rule”), 4(2). 
35 Limitations firstly flow from the definition of statutory rule, as set out in note 26 above. 
The list of exceptions relation to the definition, in Schedule 4 to the NSW SL Act, 
includes standing orders of the Houses of Parliament, rules of court, by-laws of a 
university and rules made under a variety of specified statutes. Further limitations flow 
from the definition of “principal statutory rule”, as set out in the text accompanying note 
28 above. In addition s 6(1)(a) empowers the Minister to certify that a proposed rule 
relates to matters set out in Schedule 3, which lists, inter alia, matters arising under federal, 
State or Territory uniform or complementary legislation; matters involving the adoption 
of international or Australian standards or codes of practice where assessment of costs 
and benefits has already been made; and matters not likely to impose an appreciable 
burden, cost or disadvantage on any sector of the public, having regard to any assessment 
of those issues by the relevant agency after application of the guidelines in Schedule 1. 
The Minister also has power to issue an excepting certificate where the rule is to be made 
by a person or body not expressly subject to the control of the Minister so that it is not 
practicable for the Minister to comply (s 6(1)(c)); and to postpone compliance with s 5 
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applies to all three elements: the RIS, the public notification and 
the consultation. In NSW sunsetting, with exceptions and room 
for postponements, applies after five years, triggering a fresh 
process of review of the statutory rule.36  
The RIS is to state the objectives sought to be achieved by the 
proposed rule; the alternative options by which those objectives 
can be achieved; assessment of the costs and benefits of the rule; 
assessment of the costs and benefits of each alternative option to 
the making of the rule, including the option of not proceeding with 
any action; and assessment as to which of the alternative options 
involves the greatest net benefit or the least net cost to the 
community.37 The RIS should also describe the consultation 
program to be undertaken.38 The RIS requirement thus 
contemplates and supports the consultation process, providing a 
plan for eliciting comments from the public and offering a 
justification for the proposed rule to which the comments may be 
directed. 
 Consultation 
The consultation required by the NSW SL Act is described in clear 
terms. A notice is to be published in the government gazette, in a daily 
newsletter circulating throughout NSW, and where appropriate in any 
relevant trade, professional, business or public interest journal or 
publication. The notice is to advise that it is proposed to make a 
statutory rule, that the RIS is available and how it may be obtained or 
inspected, and invite submissions within a specified time, but not less 
than 21 days from publication of the notice.39 The persons to be 
consulted are “appropriate representatives of consumers, the public, 
relevant interest groups, and any sectors of industry or commerce, 
likely to be affected by the proposed statutory rule”.40  
The nature and extent of the publicity for the proposed rule and 
the consultation, is to be commensurate with the impact likely to 
arise for consumers, the public, relevant interest groups and any 
sector of industry or commerce, from the making of the statutory 
rule.41 Thus, while the NSW SL Act expressly requires that an 
opportunity be given to make submissions, whether an oral hearing 
is provided is a matter for discretionary judgment on the part of 
the responsible Minister, in light of the likely impact of the rule. 
While there is no requirement to give an oral hearing. That does 
not prevent a department or agency that prepares a proposed rule 
from voluntarily consulting with known stakeholders or arranging 
for public meetings to information sessions. 
                                                
for 4 months on the ground that in the Minister’s opinion the special circumstances of 
the case the public interest requires that the rule be made (s 6(1)(b),(2)).  
36 NSW SL Act ss 10, 10A, 11, Sch 5. 
37 NSW SL Act Schedule 2(1)(a)-(e). 
38 NSW SL Act Schedule 2(1)(f). 
39 NSW SL Act s 5(2)(a). 
40 NSW SL Act s 5(2)(b). 
41 NSW SL Act s 5(3). 
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All the comments and submissions received are to be appropriately 
considered.42 Once the rule has been made, and the process of 
receiving written submissions is completed, the RIS and written 
submissions are sent to the Legislation Review Committee.43 The 
criteria to be applied by the Legislation Review Committee are set 
out in the NSW LR Act. One of the criteria is whether the 
responsible Minister appears not to have complied with the RIS, 
public notice and consultation procedures.44 The Committee 
makes a report to both Houses of the NSW Parliament in which it 
may recommend disallowance of a rule on the ground of non-
compliance with these procedures.45 
The duties to engage in cost benefit analysis, prepare an RIS, give 
notice, and consult, are expressed to apply “so far as is reasonably 
practicable”.46 In addition the NSW SL Act expressly provides that 
non-compliance with the procedures does not render a statutory 
rule invalid.47 In the absence of these “no invalidity” provisions, a 
statutory procedure for advertising a proposal to invite 
submissions, or a procedure requiring the consideration of 
submissions, could be expected to be “enforced” via administrative 
law. A court in judicial review would be likely to find that, on the 
proper construction of the relevant statute, the legislative intention 
was that non-compliance with the statutory procedure is to result 
in invalidity of the rule.48 However the intention of the NSW SL 
Act is expressly stated. Non-compliance with the requirements for 
cost benefit analysis, preparation of an RIS, and consultation, does 
not render the statutory rule invalid. Accountability may be sought 
via a different branch of government, by one of the Houses of 
Parliament disallowing the rule on the recommendation of the 
Committee, on account of non-compliance with the procedures. 
 Review by a Parliamentary Committee 
In the early days of the NSW SL Act, the Regulation Review 
Committee occasionally referred in its reports to submissions that 
the responsible Minister had forwarded to it. In rare cases, the 
Committee disclosed in a report that it had met with 
representatives of an interest group to discuss a proposed rule. 
Correspondence with the Minister responsible for making the rule 
could be included in the report, indicating the Committee’s 
invitation to reconsider aspects of the rule that the Committee 
                                                
42 NSW SL Act s 5(2)(c). 
43 NSW SL Act s 5(4). 
44 NSW LR Act s 9(1)(b)(viii). 
45 NSW LR Act s 9(1)(c). 
46 NSW SL Act ss 4(1), 5(1). 
47 NSW SL Act s 9. 
48 The leading case on this principle, procedural ultra vires, is Project Blue Sky Inc v 
Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355. In cases specifically concerned with 
statutory duties to “consider” a matter, or to “have regard to” submissions from the 
public, Australian courts have held that the decision-maker must direct an “active 
intellectual process” at the matter or submissions: Tickner v Chapman (1995) 57 FCR 451 
at 462; Tobacco Institute of Australia Ltd v National Health and Medical Research Council (1996) 
71 FCR 265 at 277. 
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considered infringed a statutory criterion. Ministerial responses, 
sometimes in terse language, were also included. This indicates that 
in some cases the Committee sought to enliven a process of 
deliberation with the rule-maker. However, there is no suggestion 
that the Committee adopted a course of requesting a responsible 
Minister to revisit a public consultation process or to enhance it by 
offering an oral hearing to interested persons or groups. 
If the status quo remained as at the time of the Committee’s report, 
with a ministerial refusal to amend the proposed rule so as to avoid 
infringement of a criterion, no doubt the report was sent to the 
Houses of Parliament recommending disallowance. The Committee 
does not provide a tally of disallowed rules in its annual reports. It is 
left to the interested researcher to assess the Committee’s success rate 
in having its recommendations followed by Parliament, by searching 
Hansard records.  
From 2002, when the Committee acquired the additional function of 
scrutiny of bills, the emphasis in its work quickly shifted to that new 
function. The Committee no longer publishes reports on its review of 
particular rules. It provides a digest with summaries of reviews of 
rules, giving little information about the kinds of submissions 
received. Of the statutory criteria the Committee applies, the most 
prominent is whether the proposed rule trespasses unduly on 
individual rights and liberties.49  
No suggestion has been made in any recent report that the 
Committee has given an oral hearing to any person or group that 
made a submission. Recommendations for disallowance are 
infrequently made. The Committee continues to give no inkling in 
its digest reports as to whether a House of Parliament has 
disallowed a statutory rule following its recommendation. In some 
cases, the digest report records that the Committee wrote to the 
responsible Minister expressing its concern about a proposed 
statutory rule not meeting one of the statutory criteria. The 
outcome of such consultation with the Minister is left uncertain. 
 A General Non-Statutory Process 
Since 2008 the Better Regulation Office (BRO) within the NSW 
Department of Premier and Cabinet has monitored a non-statutory 
process of submitting a regulatory impact assessment with a new 
bill or proposed delegated legislation. The policy imposes 
requirements that overlap with those of the NSW SL Act.50 It may 
                                                
49 NSW LR Act s 9(1)(b)(i). For example, the Assisted Reproductive Technology Regulation 2014 
re-made a regulation providing for the registration of ART providers, disclosure of 
information and record keeping in relation to gamete donation, and maintenance of a 
central register. The Committee considered whether the regulation trespassed unduly on 
individual rights and liberties because of its impact on the privacy of donors. However, 
the Committee took into account that the regulation was not retrospective, so that donors 
were aware of new regime, and made no further comment: Legislation Review Committee 
Legislation Review Digest No 64/55 – 4 November 2014. 
50 As was acknowledged in New South Wales Government Department of Premier and 
Cabinet, Better Regulation Office, REVIEW OF NSW REGULATORY GATEKEEPING AND 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT PROCESS, Issues Paper, September 2011, para 1.2. 
Transparency and Rule Making in Australia – Margaret Allars 
– 187 – 
International Journal of Open Governments 
http://ojs.imodev.org/index.php?journal=RIGO 
cover some delegated legislation that is not already subject to the 
NSW SL Act. 
A Guide to Better Regulation issued by the Premier in 2008 and later 
updated, sets out the procedures. It describes when consultation is 
advisable and what constitutes effective consultation.51 While 
regulatory impact assessments provided to the BRO must include 
a statement about the consultation undertaken, what is required is 
expressed at the level of very general advice, with the BRO not 
adopting a role of monitoring consultation.52 The BRO procedures 
lack public notification of the regulatory impact assessment or any 
specific requirement that consultation is to occur. The policy is an 
internal scrutiny mechanism, rather than a process for publication, 
consultation and review that promotes transparency. 
§ 3 – FEDERAL RULE-MAKING 
 Reform 
Federal regulations are scrutinised by the Senate Standing 
Committee on Regulations and Ordinances. The Committee 
applies a limited number of criteria, set out in standing orders.53 It 
is a bipartisan committee, with strong expectations that the Senate 
will disallow a regulation if the Committee so recommends. The 
criteria are more limited than those applied in NSW, and do not 
include a criterion as to whether the delegated law-maker has 
engaged in regulatory impact assessment or provided adequate 
consultation. 
In 1992 the Administrative Review Council (ARC) recommended 
the introduction of a “legislative instrument proposal”, or RIS 
requirement, similar to that in Victoria and NSW, together with 
consultation procedures, in the making of federal legislative 
instruments.54 The ARC identified the advantages of an RIS as 
improvement in the quality of delegated legislation, or even a 
decision not to make it, by a process of potential revision as a result 
of its exposure to different views of interested groups.55 According 
to this approach it is consultation that secures a benefit from an 
RIS requirement. The ARC rejected submissions made to it by 
some agencies that informal consultation suffices. The absence of 
a statutory requirement for consultation raises the risk of exclusion 
of legitimate points of view.56 
                                                
51 New South Wales Government Department of Premier and Cabinet, Better Regulation 
Office, GUIDE TO BETTER REGULATION, 2008, 2009, Section 3. 
52 Issues Paper, REVIEW OF NSW REGULATORY GATEKEEPING AND IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
PROCESSES (September 2011). 
53 Commonwealth Parliament, SENATE STANDING ORDERS Order 23(3). 
54 Administrative Review Council, RULE MAKING BY COMMONWEALTH AGENCIES, 
Report No 35 (1992) Chapter 5. 
55 Administrative Review Council, RULE MAKING BY COMMONWEALTH AGENCIES 
Report No 35 (1992) paras 5.21, 5.22. 
56 Administrative Review Council, RULE MAKING BY COMMONWEALTH AGENCIES 
Report No 35 (1992) para 5.28. 
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During the 1990s several bills to implement the measures 
recommended by the ARC lapsed without enactment.57 Finally, in 
2003 the Legislative Instruments Act 2003 (Cth) (LI Act) was enacted. 
Its most important reform was the establishment of a Federal 
Register of Legislative Instruments (Register), modelled on the 
United States Register of similar name.58 The LI Act was directed 
to ensuring transparency of legislative instruments in the sense that 
they were readily accessible by electronic means in one location.59 
Existing instruments were to be “backcaptured” over specified 
periods so that all instruments were ultimately entered on the 
Register. This strengthened the existing traditional provisions for 
notification and publication after instruments are made, enhancing 
transparency by ensuring that rules are accessible.  
The LI Act added an additional mechanism that strengthened this 
ex post facto notification. Not only the instrument but also an 
explanatory statement for it was to be placed on the Register.60 
While there are exceptions, these statements are notoriously 
uninformative, being paraphrases of the clauses in the instrument. 
As is developed below, one feature of the requirements for 
explanatory statements had particular significance. 
Several other reforms achieved by the LI Act have secondary 
significance for transparency. It introduced a uniform 
nomenclature for federal delegated legislation: “the legislative 
instrument”.61 Measures were put in place to improve the drafting 
of all legislative instruments.62 
However the LI Act did not implement the ARC’s 
recommendation for the introduction of an RIS.63 While the LI Act 
introduced sunsetting after 10 years for legislative instruments,64 
the significance of sunsetting is diminished when the re-making of 
the instrument is not accompanied by an RIS or a real consultation 
procedure. 
 Public Notice and Consultation 
The ARC’s recommendation that delegated law-makers have a duty 
to consult with interest groups before making instruments was 
                                                
57 Following the introduction of the Legislative Instruments Bill 1994 (Cth), two 
parliamentary committees reported, amendments were made in the Senate, but the bill 
lapsed when elections called in 1994. The Legislative Instruments Bill 1996 (Cth) 
incorporated amendment made to the 1994 Bill, but had a greater focus on reducing red 
tape for business. The Senate proposed amendments and returned the Bill to the House 
of Representatives, where in 1997 it was laid aside. The Legislative Instruments Bill (No 
2) 1996 lapsed when federal elections were called in September 1996.  
58 LI Act Pt 4. 
59 LI Act Pt 4.  
60 The LI Act s 26 (former) required an explanatory statement to be lodged in the Register 
with the legislative instrument. Failure to do so did not affect the validity or enforceability 
of the instrument. 
61 This regularisation of nomenclature assisted in removing uncertainty as to the status of 
some rules, sometimes called “quasi-legislation”. See also LI Act s 10. 
62 LI Act Pt 2. Drafting is to be undertaken by parliamentary counsel. 
63 Administrative Review Council, RULE MAKING BY COMMONWEALTH AGENCIES 
Report No 35 (1992). 
64 LI Act Pt 6.  
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heavily diluted in the LI Act. Under the grand heading “Part 3 – 
Consultation Before Making Legislative Instruments” were just 
three sections: 17, 18 and 19. These sections did not deserve the 
description “consultation”.  
Section 17(1) provided that before a rule-maker makes a legislative 
instrument, “particularly where the proposed instrument is likely 
to: (a) have a direct, or substantial indirect, effect on business; or 
(b) restrict competition”, the rule-maker “must be satisfied that any 
consultation that is considered by the rule-maker to be appropriate 
and reasonably practicable to undertake, has been undertaken”. 
This section did not impose a duty to consult. It emphasised that 
if consultation occurred, its extent was a matter of discretion. The 
foundation for the discretion as to the extent of consultation that 
was “appropriate” was an apparently unfettered discretion of the 
rule-maker to decide whether to consult at all.  
Section 17(2) was a curious provision, inviting the rule–maker to 
look back on the decision, already made and implemented, 
regarding the nature of any consultation, and assess whether “the 
consultation that was undertaken is appropriate”. In answering that 
question, the rule-maker was expressly given a discretion to “have 
regard to any relevant matter”.  
This included the extent to which the consultation drew on the 
knowledge of persons having expertise in fields relevant to the 
proposed instrument, and ensured that persons likely to be affected 
by the proposed instrument had an adequate opportunity to 
comment on its proposed content.65 Section 17 did not disclose 
any particular purpose of this ex post facto reflection on the part 
of the rule-maker. 
At the end of s 17 there appeared a note that the explanatory 
statement to be placed on the Register is to contain a description 
of the consultation undertaken, or, if there was no consultation, 
the explanation for its absence. This duty flowed, mysteriously, 
from the definition of “explanatory statement” in s 4 of the LI 
Act.66  
Consultation is of little value if the person consulted is not notified of 
the content of the proposed instrument. No provision was made in 
the LI Act for the proposed instrument to be notified to the public. 
Section 17(3) expressly gave the rule-maker a discretion as to whether 
                                                
65 Legislative Instruments Act s 17(2)(a) and (b). 
66 A review of the operation of consultation under the LI Act revealed that agencies 
seemed unaware of s 17: Senate Standing Committee on Regulations and Ordinances 
CONSULTATION UNDER THE LEGISLATIVE INSTRUMENTS ACT 2003 INTERIM REPORT 
113th Report (June 2007). There was a lack of detail in explanatory statements of the 
consultation undertaken. The definition in s 4 of “explanatory statement” included, in s 
4(d), a description of the nature of consultation if it was undertaken under s 17 before 
the instrument was made. This definition section was an inappropriate place to discuss 
consultation procedures. In 2012 subsection (1A) was inserted into s 26 of the LI Act, 
picking up the definition of explanatory statement. A note referring to s 26(1A) was 
inserted at the end of s 17. The s 4 definition was amended to simply refer to s 26. The 
explanatory statement also had to include a statement of compatibility prepared under 
the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Cth): LI Act s 26(1A)(f) (former). The 
note stated that a failure to lodge the statement in accordance with s 26(1) did not affect 
the validity of the instrument: LI Act s 26(2). 
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the proposed rule was notified to bodies or representatives of persons 
likely to be affected by it, by providing that consultation “could 
involve notification, either directly or by advertisement”. Section 17(3) 
expressly provided that this reference to the possibility of advance 
public notification was not to limit by implication the form of any 
consultation which the rule-maker engaged in under s 17(1) (as a 
matter of discretion). That advance public notification and the content 
of any notification was entirely a matter for the discretion of the rule-
maker, was given further emphasis. Section 17(3) went on to provide 
that any such notification, if it was done, “could invite submissions” 
by a specified date, “or might invite” participation in “public 
hearings”. 
These references to consultation suggested that it was a path to be 
trod tentatively, only where necessary, and without offering too much. 
Section 17 sent a message of discouragement to rule-makers with 
regard to consulting. As if this were not sufficient, s 18(1) provided 
that despite s 17, the nature of an instrument may be such that 
“consultation might be unnecessary or inappropriate”.  
There followed in s 18(2) a list of seven classes of instruments that 
were “examples” of those where the rule-maker may be satisfied 
that consultation is not necessary or appropriate. These included 
instruments of a minor or machinery nature; or required as a matter 
of urgency; or required by an issue of national security; or relating 
to service in the Australian Defence Force.67 Two further classes 
were extremely broad. The first was any instrument relating to 
employment.68 The second was an instrument that gives effect to a 
decision announced in the federal Budget that (i) repeals, imposes 
or adjusts a tax, fee or charge; (b) confers, revokes or alters an 
entitlement; or (c) imposes, revokes or alters an entitlement.69  
Finally, making it absolutely clear that transparency was not 
necessary, s 19 of the LI Act provided that if the rule-maker failed 
to consult, that failure to consult did not affect the validity or 
enforceability of an instrument. 
 Further Legislative Change 
On 6 March 2016 the Acts and Instruments (Framework Reform) Act 
2015 (Cth) (Framework Act) commenced. The LI Act was re-
named the Legislation Act 2003 (Cth) (Legislation Act). The 
principal work of the amendments was to extend the Register to 
include Acts as well as instruments, re-naming it the Federal 
Register of Legislation. As to notification and consultation with 
respect to rule-making, little changed.  
Section 17(1) is amended to remove the reference to giving 
particular attention to whether consultation is appropriate and 
reasonably practicable to undertake, where the proposed 
instrument will have a direct, or substantial indirect, effect on 
business, or restrict competition. Section 17(1) is now expressed in 
                                                
67 Legislative Instruments Act s 18(2)(a), (b), (d), (g). 
68 Legislative Instruments Act s 18(2)(f). 
69 Legislative Instruments Act s 18(2)(c). 
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more general terms, but still invites the rule-maker to reach a state 
of satisfaction as to whether it is “appropriate and … reasonably 
practicable” to consult. The amendment to s 17(1) removes the 
suggestion that rule-makers might at least take a closer look at the 
possibility of consultation where the proposed instrument affects 
business or competition.  
The note at the end of s 17 is amended to refer to s 15J(2), which 
is now the source of the duty to include in an explanatory statement 
accompanying an instrument the consultation undertaken.  
Section 18 is repealed. This removes the added emphasis given to 
the absence of any duty to consult when certain classes of rules are 
made. It is of course true that there is no need to create exceptions 
when no duty to consult has been imposed. 
Section 19 remains in place. This provision is in similar terms to 
the provision in the NSW SL Act that non-compliance with the 
RIS, public notification and consultation procedure does not 
invalidate a statutory rule. As discussed above, the approach here 
is that accountability in cases of non-compliance is to be secured 
through the legislative process. The requirements are not 
enforceable duties that may be supervised in judicial review. 
Whether it would be preferable ensure that a statutory requirement 
to consult is an enforceable duty is not explored here. The principal 
point to be made about s 19 is that the section is not necessary. 
Section 17 does not speak of any requirement at all but emphasises 
that a discretion exists.  
The heading to Part 2 is removed. Sections 17 and 19 now belong 
to “Part 2 – Key Concepts for Legislative Instruments and 
Notifiable Instruments”.70 The new heading, replacing the word 
“Consultation” with “Key Concepts” reflects more accurately the 
true position. Sections 17 and 19, in their original and current 
forms, do not promote consultation.  
The current position as to general statutory duties to consult before 
making federal legislative instruments can be simply stated. There 
is no statutory requirement to prepare an RIS, or to notify the 
public that a proposed instrument is available for inspection. If 
consultation was undertaken under s 17 of the Legislation Act 
before the instrument was made, in the exercise of discretion, the 
explanatory statement for the instrument must contain a 
description of the nature of the consultation. If no consultation 
was undertaken, the statement must explain why no such 
consultation was undertaken.71  
There is no distinct criterion relating to the matter of consultation 
to be applied by the Senate Standing Committee on Regulations 
and Ordinances. There is thus no statutory requirement to consult 
                                                
70 The new expression “notifiable instruments” should not be taken to indicate that 
notification requirements have been introduced. This is a new class of instruments of a 
machinery nature or concerned with commencement of instruments: Legislation Act s. 
11. Notifiable instruments are not disallowable and do not sunset. Since ss 17 and 19 
apply only to legislative instruments, the exception formerly made in s 18 for instruments 
of a machinery nature is widened through the new class. 
71 Legislation Act s 15J(2)(d),(e). 
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nor, as it must follow, any accountability though the relevant 
scrutiny committee. The requirement to explain a failure to consult 
in the explanatory statement is in the nature of a duty to give 
reasons and has no further implication. The federal position stands 
in stark contrast to that in NSW. The public notification and RIS 
requirements that make consultation effective are not simply 
divorced from consultation. Rule-makers are implicitly reassured 
that consultation is optional and need not be pursued. 
 Non-Statutory Process 
As in NSW, the federal legislative process now incorporates a non-
statutory process of regulatory impact assessment. The federal 
Office of Best Practice Regulation (OBPR), a division of the 
Department of Finance and Deregulation, has administered a non-
statutory requirement for regulatory impact assessment. Its work is 
driven by the policy of the Council of Australian Governments 
(COAG) on best practice regulatory impact analysis in the 
preparation of national regulatory proposals or national standards. 
Since the federal government’s announcement in 2014 of a “cutting 
red-tape” policy, the OBPR has been located within the 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. 
A guide issued by the OBPR requires that regulation with a 
significant impact be accompanied by an RIS, but simply gives 
advice as to the different levels of consultation that might be 
appropriate.72 This policy based process does not provide for 
advance public notification of a proposed instrument, or for 
consultation with interested persons or groups, with an 
opportunity for comment. It is not directed to securing 
transparency. 
 Trans-Pacific Partnership 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a trade agreement amongst 
twelve Pacific rim countries, including the United States and 
Australia, signed on 4 February 2016, after seven years of 
negotiation. It contains measures to lower tariffs, promote 
innovation, productivity and competitiveness and establish an 
investor-state dispute settlement mechanism. 
Chapter 26 – Transparency and Anti-Corruption in the TPP has 
not yet attracted attention in Australia. Australia is already 
compliant with the requirement in Article 26.2(5) to promptly 
publish a federal regulation of general application that affects the 
matters with which the TPP is concerned, together with an 
explanation of its purpose and rationale. This is covered by the 
Federal Register and the requirements under the Legislation Act to 
publish explanatory statements for legislative instruments and bills. 
                                                
72 Department of Finance and Deregulation Office of Best Practice Regulation BEST 
PRACTICE REGULATION HANDBOOK (November 2006) Chapter 4, replaced by 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet Office of Best Practice Regulation THE 
AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT GUIDE TO REGULATION (2014) Chapter 5.  
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The TPP only requires such publication in the case of regulatory 
measures in the areas covered in the TPP.  
The TPP speaks of measures, not just in a law or regulation, but 
also in a procedure or administrative ruling of general application 
with respect to a matter covered by the TPP. It is possible that 
some federal regulatory measures affecting these areas may be 
introduced through policy. Administrative rulings by regulatory 
agencies are not published on the Federal Register. The extent to 
which such rulings would otherwise be published may depend on 
whether they are adjudicative decisions or policies that are required 
to be published by the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth).  
However, Article 2.6 requires much more than publication at the 
end of the day. Article 26.2(2)(a) requires a party to the TPP, to the 
extent possible, to publish the regulatory measure in advance. 
Interested persons and other parties to the TPP are to be given a 
reasonable opportunity to comment on the proposed measures.73 
In the case of a proposed regulation by a party’s central 
government with respect to any matter covered by the TPP, that is 
likely to affect trade or investment between the parties, each party 
is to publish the proposed regulation in an official journal or on an 
official website, preferably online and consolidated into a single 
portal.74 The regulation should be published at least 60 days before 
comments are due, giving an interested person sufficient time to 
evaluate the proposed regulation.  
When notified, the regulation should be accompanied by an 
explanation of its purpose and rationale.75 There should be a period 
for receipt and consideration of comments. The party to the TPP 
is encouraged to explain any significant modifications made to the 
proposed regulation, preferably on an official website or in an 
online journal.  
The political appetite for the TPP may currently be waning, 
including within Australia. If it does become necessary to draft 
legislation incorporating the requirements of the TPP into 
Australian domestic law, the federal reluctance to embrace 
statutory RIS and consultation procedures in rule-making might 
not be challenged. The federal government could attempt to 
discharge its obligations under Article 26.2(2)(a) and 26.2(4) by 
administrative procedures and policies. Policies are not binding and 
do not have the force of law. Footnote 2 to Article 26.2(4) 
proposes some methods for discharging the obligation that are less 
formal than statutory duties of notice and comment. If a policy 
based path were taken, it would be necessary to amend s 17 of the 
Legislation Act. However, s 17 does no work in any event, other 
than to provide implicit reassurance to rule-makers that they need 
not consult with the public. 
                                                
73 TPP Art 2.6(2)(b). 
74 TPP Art 2.6(4)(a). 
75 TPP Art 2.6(4)(c). 
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CONCLUSIONS 
A complex scene persists in Australia with regard to general 
statutory requirements for giving public notice and an opportunity 
for comment before delegated legislation is made. A gulf exists 
between the position in NSW and the other States where an RIS, 
public notification and consultation regime has been adopted, and 
the general rule-making requirements at the federal level. The 
difference is not so stark in relation to non statutory RIS 
requirements for submitting proposed delegated legislation to a 
cabinet office for approval.  
The genesis of the idea of combining public notice and 
consultation procedures with an RIS requirement was inspired in 
Victoria by notice and comment rule-making in the United States 
and underpinning theories of participation as a necessary element 
of the democratic process. The consultation procedure as it now 
operates in NSW does not approach a deliberative process, but 
does allow affected persons and interest groups to make their views 
known before a statutory rule is made. The federal approach is 
marked by a reluctance, or even fear, of imposing general notice 
and consultation requirements on rule-makers. That may persist, 
unaffected by any possible impact of Australia’s obligations under 
the TPP.  
This fractured picture as to the degree of transparency in the 
making of rules in Australia is interwoven with a confusion about 
the relationship between RIS requirements and public notice and 
consultation procedures. In NSW these are integrated and 
interdependent, with notice and consultation strengthening the 
effectiveness of the RIS in improving the rule made. At the federal 
level the policy based RIS requirements are regarded as important 
and effective, disconnected from any public notice or consultation 
other than steps taken voluntarily at the discretion of the rule-
maker. Analysis of the relationship, no doubt with empirical input 
and a comparative approach, may make it possible to draw 
conclusions as to the role of transparency not only in promoting 
the democratic good of participation in government decision-
making but also in securing the effectiveness of regulatory impact 
assessment. 
 
